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ARTICLES

DEBT FINANCING AND MOTIVATION
George G. Triantis*
I.

INTRODUCTION

An individual's performance in a given activity is a function
of her effort and her competence, as well as her surrounding
conditions. Effort, in turn, can be divided into three characteristics: direction, intensity and duration. Intensity and duration of
effort reflect the individual's motivation with respect to the
given activity. Motivation is the product of a cognitive process
that anticipates the outcomes of effort and, particularly, the
degree to which the individual will be satisfied or dissatisfied
with her performance. While individuals might define satisfaction in terms of input (i.e., the amount of effort applied to the
task), they more typically set standards for output (i.e., performance) that are derived from internal and external sources.
Performance is commonly judged by a dichotomous successfailure standard as opposed to a graduated metric standard.
This standard has both a prospective and retrospective impact
on motivation. For example, an individual is motivated to raise
her effort to avoid failure, and, if failure occurs, she may be
motivated to redirect, intensify or prolong future effort to avoid
the recurrence of failure.

* Nicholas E. Chimicles Research Professor in Business Law and Regulation,
University of Virginia. This is a slightly revised text of the George E. Allen Chair
Lecture of February 24, 1997. I am grateful for the research assistance of Jason
Krikorian and the comments of my colleague, John Monahan.
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The debate over corporate governance has raised concerns
about not only the direction (e.g., managerial entrenchment or
empire building activities), but also the intensity of managerial
effort in public corporations (e.g., shirking). Equity and debt
financing of corporate investments differ in the manner in
which their distinctive financial characteristics motivate managers. As a general proposition, equity sets a graduated standard
that tells managers to use their best efforts to maximize the
value of the firm's stock. In contrast, debt imposes fixed repayment obligations on the firm and, therefore, can be analyzed as
establishing a dichotomous measure of performance: either the
firm meets its payment obligations (success) or it defaults (failure).' Recently, scholars have pointed to this feature of debt as
an advantage of corporate leveraging. However, the superiority
of a stark success-failure standard of performance in promoting
individual effort is controversial in other contexts-for example,
the education of children in the United States-because of a
concern about the potential debilitating effects of both the prospect and the occurrence of failure on the motivation of at least
some types of individuals.
Part II presents the case for the motivational virtue of debt
in the context of the optimal capital structure debate. Part IH
draws on cognitive theories of action to propose that, by defining outcomes according to the success or failure of meeting
fixed obligations, debt may either increase or decrease managerial motivation, depending on the degree of leverage and the
cognitive characteristics of individual managers. Part IV discusses the potential negative ex post motivational effects of
corporate failure on managers that may spill over into other
segments of their lives. The case in favor of the motivational
virtue of debt financing is undermined by the existence of a
significant negative motivational externality borne by society-ironically, the same community that encourages debt financing through the tax deduction for interest payments.

1. To be sure, there are varying degrees to which the firm may fall short of
meeting its debt obligations. Since managers, however, are typically replaced when a
firm becomes insolvent, the degree of insolvency may have little bearing on their
motivation. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
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II. DEBT FINANCING AND THE CONTROL OF MANAGERIAL
AGENCY PROBLEMS

In their pure forms, debt and equity financing contracts may
be distinguished in terms of both their financial and governance
characteristics. First, debtholders are owed fixed amounts payable according to an agreed schedule. Depending on the cash
flow and the solvency of the firm, the debtholders may receive
less than these amounts; but, they are never entitled to more.
Debtholders enjoy priority over equityholders: in the event of
the dissolution or liquidation of the firm, the value of its assets
is used to pay debt claims before equity. Equityholders are
residual claimants, and, by definition, their returns may vary in
either direction with the fortunes of the firm. They may receive
periodic dividends, but typically realize the value of their interests either by selling their shares to other investors or exchanging them for cash in the dissolution of the firm. Second,
holders of equity control the decisions of the firm through their
rights to vote and replace the board of directors and to enforce
the directors' fiduciary obligations to the firm. Debtholders
derive their leverage over firm decisions from the contractual
right to enforce their debts against the borrower's assets in the
event of default.
Finance theorists have long struggled with the capital structure puzzle: assuming that a firm may finance its activities by
issuing either stock or debt in its pure form, what is the optimal mix of debt and equity in a firm's capital structure? The
capital structure debate has been informed by two types of
agency problems that arise in public corporations because of
divergent interests among the two groups of capital investors
(debt and equity) and the agents who conduct the firm's activities (the managers). When investors delegate decision making
authority to their agents, these agents are tempted to make
decisions that serve their own interests rather than those of
their principals. This conflict gives rise to managerial agency
problems. In addition, given the differences in the financial
characteristics of debt and equity described above, the two
groups of investors have divergent interests with respect to
many firm decisions. Therefore, to the extent that one group of
investors (usually assumed to be the equityholders) captures
the loyalty of management, it may cause decisions to be made
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that benefit that group to the detriment of the other investors
(usually debtholders). This gives rise to financial agency problems. The collective objective of the firm is to preserve the
gains from the division of investor and managerial finctions,
while minimizing the cost of managerial and financial agency
problems.
It is fairly well accepted that debt has a mixed effect on
corporate agency problems. While the existence of debt in a
firm's capital structure aggravates financial agency problems, it
can mitigate managerial agency problems. Corporate governance
scholarship has focused primarily on equity-centered mechanisms that police the self-interested behavior of management,
such as stockholder voting and the market for corporate control.
Debt contracts have a relatively under-appreciated role in deterring, detecting and correcting managerial slack-that is,
lapses in managerial competence or effort, as well as excessive
managerial compensation or perquisite consumption.' Instances
of managerial slack may be deterred directly by debt covenants
that proscribe them. To the extent that deterrence is not perfect
and managerial slack nevertheless occurs, a debtholder can contribute to the correction of such slack in several ways. It may
compel the replacement of managers by enforcing its debt or
triggering bankruptcy.' The lender may instead use the threat
of enforcement to persuade incumbent managers to correct the
slack. Alternatively, while a lender's enforcement may not be
severe enough to force the termination of incumbent managers,
it might signal the detection of slack to other stakeholders who
can intervene more effectively to redress the problem.4
While corporate governance properly seems to contemplate
active stakeholder monitoring and intervention in the management of the firm, it is clear that these methods of controlling
managerial slack are costly. In many cases, it may be more
cost-effective to rely on ex ante measures that correct incentives
and need little or no monitoring. The fixed periodic obligations
that distinguish debt from equity are themselves recognized as
2. See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive
Corporate Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1074-75 (1995).
3. See F.H. Buckley, The Termination Decision, 61 UMKC L. REV. 243, 246-52
(1992).
4. See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 2, at 1080-81.
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mechanisms that discipline managerial misbehavior and require
minimal monitoring activity. In two widely cited articles,5 Michael Jensen observed that the cash flow produced by some
corporations, particularly in mature or declining industries,
cannot be profitably reinvested in opportunities available to the
respective firms and should therefore be distributed to investors. Instead, managers tend to appropriate this free cash flow
by consuming perquisites or by slackening their efforts. Alternatively, they may use the cash to expand the operations of the
firm in unrelated areas where it has no comparative advantage,
but where such expansion may enhance the managers' prominence and prestige in industry, political and social circles. The
existence of periodic fixed debt obligations forces managers to
disgorge the cash flow and put it in the hands of investors who
can invest it profitably.6 Dividends or share repurchases have a
similar effect. Yet, Jensen argued that debt is a more reliable
mechanism because the consequences of missing a scheduled
debt repayment are typically far more grave than those that
follow a reduction in dividends or a decision not to repurchase
stock.
Jensen also noted that debt is a powerful agent for change. 7
A heavy debt load can induce a manager to sell off parts of the
firm's business and focus energies on core operations. More
generally, it forces managers to rethink their strategies and
induces directors to reconsider the structure and composition of
their management team.' In a more recent article, Judge

5. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance
and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986) [hereinafter Jensen, Agency Costs]; Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation,HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989,
at 61 [hereinafter Jensen, Eclipse].
6. Jensen notes that "debt is in effect a substitute for dividends-a mechanism
to force managers to disgorge cash rather than spend it on empire-building projects
with low or negative returns, bloated staffs, indulgent perquisites, and organizational
inefficiencies." Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 67.
7. See id.
8.
Overleveraging creates the crisis atmosphere managers require to
slash unsound investment programs, shrink overhead, and dispose of assets that are more valuable outside the company. The proceeds generated
by these overdue restructurings can then be used to reduce debt to more
sustainable levels, creating a leaner, more efficient and competitive organization.
In other circumstances, the violation of debt covenants creates a
board-level crisis that brings new actors onto the scene, motivates a fresh
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Frank Easterbrook made a similar argument by referring to
debt as an incentive device that leads to greater managerial effort.9 In outlining the effect of leveraged managerial buyouts,
Easterbrook observed that a manager holds a larger fraction of
the residual claim in her firm after a buyout and therefore
shares to a greater degree in the financial rewards and costs of
her efforts. Easterbrook took his case one step further and
presented a more general claim about debt: it promotes greater
effort by placing managers "close to the margin.""
Perhaps more important, after a firm promises to pay out
most of its cash flow to holders of debt, it is eternally skating on thin ice. Managers (at least top managers) realize
that deficiencies in their own efforts could cause the firm to
fail .... And in competition, in which a few percent reduction in total costs of production spells the difference between industry leadership and failure, effects of this kind
may be decisive even if they are "small" by absolute standards."
Such claims about the desirable incentive effect of debt and
of the prospect of failure does not acknowledge the existence of
a limit to the motivational virtue of corporate leveraging. Raising the proportion of debt in a firm's capital structure beyond a
certain point raises serious concerns about both the ex ante
motivational effects of debt and the ex post effects of failure.
First, to use Easterbrook's metaphor, the manager's worry
about falling through thin ice does not always lead to superior
performance; it may instead lead to a fatalistic sense that effort
might be wasted in a futile cause. Part IV applies cognitive
motivational theories to suggest the conditions under which
effort enhancement or reduction is likely to occur. Second, the
failure of a firm may have a destructive effect on the future
motivation of individual managers both at and away from their
jobs. The corporation may not have to bear this cost if it replaces its managers shortly after failure. The negative externalities

review of top management and strategy, and accelerates response.
Id.
9. See Frank H. Easterbrook, High-Yield Debt as an Incentive Device, 11 INTL
REv. L. & EcON. 183 (1991).
10. See id.
11. Id. at 186.
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from perceived personal failure, however, are borne by the community. As a matter of public policy, therefore, we should be as
concerned about the loss in value of individuals (i.e., both private and public investment in human capital) due to motivational externalities of corporate failure, as we are about the loss
of synergies that are threatened by the liquidation of a firm
that defaults on its debt obligations. Part IV extends the analysis to consider the potential motivational costs of debt over multiple periods.
HI. DEBT FINANCING AS A GOAL SETTING MECHANISM
In Jensen's and Easterbrook's paradigms, debt operates as an
incentive device in the following manner. A leveraged firm is
obligated to make periodic payments to its creditors and therefore must produce the cash flow to do so. If the firm fails to
meet its debt obligations and defaults, its creditors may enforce
their claims by removing assets from the firm. As a separate
consideration, if the value of the firm's assets falls below the
amount of its debt, the firm becomes insolvent and its creditors
may invoke proceedings to liquidate the firm. In cases of either
creditor enforcement or the initiation of insolvency proceedings,
corporate executives experience a sense of failure and are at
risk of being replaced.' The performance (in terms of cash
flow and firm asset value) that is necessary to avoid these
consequences rises with the degree to which the firm is financed by debt rather than equity. As a result, managers in
highly leveraged firms are driven to work harder than their
counterparts in less leveraged firms where there is greater
tolerance for slack in either cash flow or asset value.
This theory is oversimplified because it assumes that managers respond to the threat of punishment in a predictable and
monotonic fashion. Leveraging increases the expected punishment for managerial slack by raising the probability that the
firm will not meet the implied cash-flow or asset-value target.
12. This conclusion appears to hold even if the debtor firm is reorganized rather
than liquidated. See Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks and Blockholders,
27 J. FIN. ECoN. 355, 369-71 (1990); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 723 (1993).
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The model postulates that managers respond to this threat by
working harder to avoid failure. If managerial effort, however,
is regulated by the anticipated consequences of corporate default or insolvency, then predictions as to the direction and
magnitude of the motivational effect of debt must rest on the
cognitive process by which individuals anticipate future outcomes and convert them into motivators of action.
In order to establish a general framework for analyzing this
cognitive process, I make the following simplifying assumptions.
A corporation has a single manager who has no financial stake
in the firm. The manager makes all the decisions of the firm
except the capital structure decision, which is made by investors as a group. The investors decide the optimal mix of debt
and equity financing using only motivational criteria: they select the mix of fixed and residual obligations that provides the
optimal incentives for the manager to exert effort in carrying
out her responsibilities. The firm can default on its debt only
by failing to meet a scheduled repayment obligation; creditor
rights upon insolvency in the balance sheet sense are disregarded. Payment default causes corporate failure, which gives rise
to an exogenous determination and significant probability that
the manager will be replaced. This risk of job (and income) loss
is the only externally imposed punishment for the firm's failure
that is borne by the manager.
The motivational benefits of debt may be restated in terms of
goal setting theory, one of the most accepted cognitive theories
of motivation. The issuance of debt in the scenario described
above sets challenging goals for periodic cash flows. The firm's
managers accept these goals as their personal goals (with greater or lesser degrees of enthusiasm, as I explain below). These
goals provide direction for managerial action and promote effort
and persistence in the pursuit of the goal."3 Three core predictions of goal setting theory have been the subject of considerable empirical testing and lend support to the professed motivational virtue of corporate debt. First, specific goals are more
effective in motivating higher performance than general goals,
such as to do one's best. 4 In this sense, debt is to be preferred
13. See EDWIN A. LOCKE & GARY P. LATHAM, A THEORY OF GOAL SETTING &
TASK PERFORMANCE 86-108 (1990).
14. See Albert Bandura & Daniel Cervone, Self-Evaluative and Self-Efficacy Mech-
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to equity because it encourages the manager to set specific cash
flow goals. This prescription is reinforced by the second prediction that proximal goals have a greater positive effect on performance than distal goals.'" The periodic payment obligations
may give rise to more immediate goals than the pressure to
maximize the value of equity over a longer time horizon.
The third core prediction is that, within some outer limits,
more difficult goals tend to motivate higher levels of effort and
performance than easier goals. 6 The mix of debt and equity in
a firm's capital structure can therefore be adjusted to provide
challenging, specific and periodic goals for its manager. The
link between goal level and performance motivation, however, is
not sufficiently direct to warrant an irrebuttable inference that
managers can be motivated to achieve larger net cash flows
simply through the higher goals that are implicitly assigned
when the firm issues a greater proportion of debt. The direction
and magnitude of the effect of goal levels on performance is
moderated by a number of factors. Most important for the purposes of this paper is the commitment of the actor to the goal
general sense of her ability to perform (her
and the actor's
"self-efficacy"'7 ). Other factors include the actual ability of the
actor, the complexity of the task and the availability of periodic
feedback. 8
Individuals perform better when they are more rather than
less committed to a challenging goal. Therefore, if increasing
anisms Governing the Motivational Effects of Goal Systems, 45 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 1017 (1983); Edwin A. Locke et al., Goal Setting and Task Performance:
1969-1980, 90 PSYCHOL. BULL. 125, 129 (1981).
15. See, e.g., ALBERT BANDuRA, SOcIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION: A
SocIAL COGNITIVE THEORY 474-77 (1986) [hereinafter BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS];

Albert Bandura & Dale H. Schunk, Cultivating Competence, Self-Efficacy, and Intrinsic Interest Through Proximal Self-Motivation, 41 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
586, 587, 593-94 (1981).
16. See, e.g., Edwin A. Locke, Toward a Theory of Task Motivation and Incentives,
3 ORG. BEHAV. AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE 157-89 (1968); Anthony J. Mento et al., A
Meta-Analytic Study of the Effects of Goal Setting on Task Performance: 1966-1984, 39
ORG. BEHAV. AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 52, 74-77 (1987).

17. The concept of self-efficacy is a central component in the social-cognitive theories developed by Albert Bandura. Bandura defines self-efficacy as one's judgment of
"how well one can execute courses of action required to deal with prospective situations." Albert Bandura, Self-Efficacy Mechanism in Human Agency, 37 A31. PSYCHOL.
122, 122-23 (1982).

18. See generally LOCKE & LATHAIM, supra note 13, at 173-225.
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the difficulty of a goal causes a reduction in commitment, the
overall effect of raising a goal level may be decided by a tradeoff between the positive effect of a higher goal level and the
negative effect of lower commitment. 9 Most people eventually
reject goals they consider to be well beyond their reach. Expectancy theory is a rational choice theory of motivation that embodies this notion of a concave effort function in a principle of
maximization of expected value of effort.2" An actor exerts effort up to the point that the cost of further effort exceeds the
expected gains from such effort. Therefore, goal commitment,
and hence motivation, is a function of the actor's subjective
assessment of: (i) the expected value of external and internal
outcomes that result from the actor's achieving or failing to
achieve the targeted level of performance; and (ii) the subjective
probability that increased effort will produce that level of performance."l
In the very stylized example in this paper, the probability
that the manager loses her job following corporate failure is
affected by neither the degree of leverage nor by the discrepancy between the goal and the performance. Under those conditions, the expected value of external consequences that follow
success or failure in meeting targeted performance does not
change as the required performance level is raised by increased
leverage. Nevertheless, there may be greater intrinsic satisfaction that follows success in meeting a more challenging goal
and a correspondingly smaller sense of dissatisfaction following
failure. As a firm sets higher goals for cash flow production, the

19. See, e.g., id. at 130.
20. A classic treatise in this field is VICTOR H. VROOM, WORK AND MOTIVATION
(1964).
21. An individual's commitment is affected by her view of conception of the goal
as a learning or performance goal. Her perspective depends on her attitude toward
innate abilities, such as intelligence. Those individuals who conceive of intelligence as
an incremental skill that is continually enhanced by experiences see goals as opportunities to develop their competencies (learning goals). Those who view intelligence as
an innate and stable entity view goals as performance demonstrations of their
proficiencies. The concern over the difficulty of goals is much more pronounced when
the individual belongs to the latter group because failure is a much more serious
threat to one's self-esteem and social standing. See Carol S. Dweck, Intrinsic Motivation, Perceived Control, and Self-Evaluation Maintenance: An Achievement Goal Analysis, in 2 RESEARCH ON MOTIVATION IN EDUCATION 289 (R.E. Ames & C. Ames eds.,

1985).
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probability of meeting those goals falls. Without a compensating
increase in the valence of achieving those goals, the actor's
commitment is likely to fall off.' Empirical studies have
shown that commitment can decline as the goal becomes more
difficult and the individual's perceived chances of reaching it
declines.'
In the discussion thus far, the firm's fixed obligations present
the manager with an all-or-nothing proposition, at least with
respect to external factors: she keeps her job if the obligations
are met and risks losing it if they are not. Yet, in reality, the
manager of a marginally solvent debtor in default may have a
much better chance of keeping her job than the manager of a
marginally insolvent firm. A series of studies have examined
the interaction between external incentives and goal difficulty,
and their combined effect on performance. There is some evidence that difficult goals operate better when combined with a
graduated incentive system rather than an all or nothing
scheme.' The purported motivational value of debt, however,
seems to be based on the fact that it creates a specific goal for
the manager. A regime of piecemeal incentives may undermine
the clear distinction between success and failure that injects
the goal with specificity.
The effect of increases in goal difficulty cannot be described
in universal terms. It depends (some would say hinges) on how
each individual views her ability to control events that affect

22. An opposite problem might result if the increase in goal difficulty is not accompanied by a reduction in commitment. This combination can create pressure on
the actor leading to emotional states-notably, stress and anxiety-that can be detrimental to performance. Debilitating anxiety is more likely if managers have less
training or self-efficacy. See BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 15, at 447.
23. See LOCKE & LATHAM, supra note 13, at 147. In a similar vein, Gilbert Brim,
the Director of the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Successful Mid-Life
Development, writes:
Where is the right level of difficulty? ... One way to describe a level of
difficulty is in terms of the probability that our action will succeed or
fail. Research on artificial tasks shows that we are most strongly motivated to try to achieve success when we know the risk of failure to be
about fifty-fifty. The joy of winning is enhanced by the threat of failure.
Activities that involve no risk cannot provide the joy of achievement.
GILBERT BRIM, AMBITION: How WE MANAGE SUCCESS AND FAILURE THROUGHOUT OUR
LIE 32 (1992).
24. See LOCKE & LATHAM, supra note 13, at 138-39.
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her life. In the social cognitive theory of action, this central
characteristic is known as self-efficacy: a person's judgment of
her capabilities to organize and execute courses of action required to achieve designated performance demands. The importance of perceived self-efficacy is described by Albert Bandura:
It is partly on the basis of self-beliefs of efficacy that people
choose what challenges to undertake, how much effort to
expend in the endeavor, how long to persevere in the face
of difficulties, and [these beliefs] affect their vulnerability to
stress and despondency in the face of difficulties and failures.2

The rate at which individuals reduce their commitment to an
increasingly difficult goal depends on their perceived self-efficacy, which determines their assessment of the probability of
meeting the performance standard. Some commentators suggest
that individuals will strive most and perform best when presented26 with difficulties that they perceive to be "just manageable."

The success in achieving a goal is also determined by the
actor's ability to develop strategies that are suited to the demands of the task. Although this paper is concerned with motivation, a brief digression may illustrate a problem that difficult
goals may create with respect to the direction of effort. Empirical studies have shown that the setting of goals, particularly
specific and challenging goals, stimulate planning and strategy
development. Individuals characteristically draw on their training and past experience, as well as their observations of others
attempting similar tasks. An important part of strategy development may also be experimentation with a variety of alternative approaches. There are circumstances, however, in which
specific, challenging goals do not promote, and may in fact
harm, performance of complex tasks. 27 For instance, if one has
25. Albert Bandura, Self-Regulation of Motivation and Action Through Internal
Standards and Goal Systems, in GOAL CONCEPTS IN PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 19, 29 (Lawrence A. Pervin ed., 1989).
26. See BRIM, supra note 23, at 29-49.
27. As with many other goal mechanisms, self-efficacy has been argued to affect
the strategies followed in performance. Those with a low sense of self-efficacy are
more likely to adopt erratic thought processes in developing strategies. See, e.g., Robert Wood & Albert Bandura, Effect of Perceived Controllability and Performance Stan-
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had little experience or training, difficult specific goals may
discourage learning and experimentation with alternative techniques. At the other extreme, Locke and Latham comment that
specific, hard goals may push individuals with hard goals
into a less than systematic "scramble" to find a strategy
that will get immediate results, whereas those with easy
goals, do best goals, or learning goals are more likely, or at
least equally likely, to take the time to use a more careful,
systematic approach.'
Michael Jensen called debt an agent for change.' If it is set
at too high a level, however, it may either paralyze strategy reformulation or lead to an undirected scramble for new strategies.' ° Either consequence is a cost imposed by the adverse
effect of excessive leveraging on the direction of managerial
effort.
In sum, the challenging and specific goals that are implicitly
set by corporate leveraging may not yield benefits in performance. In particular, if set too high, they may reduce the probability and, hence, the expected value of achieving the implicit
goal of a cash flow sufficient to meet fixed debt obligations. As
a result, these goals may reduce the intensity of effort. In addition, if the goals are too difficult, they may impede the development of optimal business strategy either by discouraging learning through change or by causing a random scramble.
Even if the difficulty of the goal does not discourage effort
and impair performance in the pursuit of that goal, the reduced
likelihood of success may impair the prospect of high performance in subsequent periods. People react to failure in different

dards on Self-Regulation of Complex Decision Making, 56 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 805 (1989).
28. LOCKE & LATHAM, supra note 13, at 105. Locke and Latham cite a study by
Wood and Bandura which found that subjects who were told that a game was a
learning device used better analytic strategies and performed better than subjects
who were told the game would indicate how good a manager each of them was. See
id.
29. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
30. This tendency may be reinforced by the preference of managers for risky
ventures when their firm is on the brink of insolvency. See Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUDIES 277

(1991).
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ways. Those who doubt their capabilities will tend to lower
their goals and efforts in the next period. On the other hand,
those with high self-efficacy may be spurred by the discrepancy
between performance and goals to increase their efforts next
time around and even to accept more challenging goals with
greater intensity of effort.3 '
Some people have an unshakable sense of self-efficacy that
survives countless failures. In general, however, the link be-

tween self-efficacy and performance is bidirectional; failure can
lead to lower self-confidence or self-efficacy, depending on the
explanations that individuals adopt for their failure. 2 The reduction in self-efficacy may be reflected in the next period by a
reluctance to accept similar goals and less effectiveness in performing to the required standard. This may in fact produce a
downward spiral in which failures in each period decrease the
difficulty of goals chosen in the next, the commitment to the
goals and the likelihood that those goals will be achieved.' In
this vein, there is a growing body of literature addressing the
psychological cycles that may result from job loss. In the more
extreme case, a cycle of failures may contribute to the phenomenon of learned helplessness that is discussed below.
IV. THE MOTIVATIONAL COSTS OF FAILURE

The theory of learned helplessness was spawned by the following observation in animals. Dogs in a shuttle box learned to
turn off electric shocks by jumping over a barrier. When other
dogs, however, were strapped down in harnesses so as to be
unable to stop the shocks, they later were passive and deficient

31. See BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 15, at 470-71.
32. Bandura states:
Goals not only provide direction and create incentives for action, they
also figure prominently in the development of self-efficacy. Without standards against which to measure their performances, people have little or
no basis for judging how they are doing, nor do they have much basis
for gauging their capabilities.
Id. at 470.
33. Contrast to the high performance cycle described by Locke and Latham that
is characterized by a cycle of triumphs over successively higher goals. See Edwin A.
Locke & Gary P. Latham, Work Motivation: The High Performance Cycle, in WORK
MOTIVATION 3 (U. Kleinbeck et al. eds., 1990).
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in learning the escape response when placed in circumstances
in which they could turn off the shock by jumping over the
barrier.' Uncontrollable events have been shown to have similar effects in humans. In one study, college students were divided into three groups. Individuals in the first group could stop a
loud noise by pushing a button four times (controllable noise).
Individuals in the second group experienced loud noise that was
terminated independently of their responses (uncontrollable
noise). Individuals in the third group experienced no noise (no
noise). The individuals from all three groups were then subjected to a test in which each individual could terminate loud noise
simply by moving a lever in a hand shuttle box from one side
of the box to the other. The typical subject in the uncontrollable
noise group failed to escape the noise and listened passively to
the noise in the test session. 5
Generally, learned helplessness is manifest in the display of
inappropriate passivity: that is, a lack of effort to meet the
demands of a situation with which the actor could cope. 8 This
passivity follows in the wake of uncontrollable events: that is,
the occurrence of events that are perceived to be unrelated to
the behavior of the individual.37 Finally, learned helplessness
results because the perceived uncontrollability is inappropriately
generalized to new situations. The key to the formulation of
learned helplessness is that the individual gives up trying because of internal doubt about her effectiveness rather than
because she expects that environmental contingencies have
made action futile. Hence, learned helplessness may be viewed
as an extreme case of the debilitating effect of performance
outcomes on self-efficacy and motivation. It has also been suggested that learned helplessness has detrimental cognitive ef-

34. See J.B. Overnier & Martin E.P. Seligman, Effects of Inescapable Shock Upon
Subsequent Escape and Avoidance Responding, 63 J. CoMP. & PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 28, 28-33 (1967); Martin E.P. Seligman & Steven F. Maier, Failure to Escape
Traumatic Shock, 74 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1-9 (1967).
35. See D.S. Hiroto, Locus of Control and Learned Helplessness, 102 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 187, 187-93 (1974).
36. The definition of learned helplessness is adapted from CHRISTOPHER PETERSON
ET AL., LEARNED HELPLESSNESS: A THEORY FOR THE AGE OF PERSONAL CONTROL 228-

29 (1993).
37. It is interesting that learned helplessness may result from uncontrollable
events that have bad or good outcomes. Failure is therefore a subset of
uncontrollability involving bad outcomes. See id. at 54-55.
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fects on performance by impairing the learning process and the
emotional state of the individual.
The extent to which helplessness is generalized is determined
by the manner in which the individual explains the causes of
uncontrollable outcomes. In other words, the process by which
uncontrollable events produce helplessness deficits is mediated
by the causal explanations that individuals assign to the uncontrollable events. In the late 1970s, a group of psychologists suggested that three parameters of causal explanations are central
in predicting the boundaries of learned helplessness.' First,
the explanation may be internal (some attribute of the actor) or
external (some attribute of the circumstances that would cause
the same consequences to be suffered on any other individual in
a population relevant to the actor). External explanations (e.g.,
the task was extremely difficult) are associated with universal
helplessness, while internal explanations (e.g., I am prone to
errors) lead to personal helplessness. 9 Second, the cause may
be stable or unstable over time. For example, lack of ability is
often an internal and stable explanation because ability is generally not perceived as variable over time, while lack of effort is
an internal and unstable explanation." The distinction between stable and unstable explanations predicts the boundaries
of generalization of helplessness deficits over time. Third, the
explanation may be located along a continuum between global
and specific causes. Lack of innate ability to perform a specific
task may be internal, stable and specific, while lack of intellectual stamina may be internal, stable and global. The specificglobal dimension predicts the generalization of helplessness
across situations. Individuals differ in explanatory styles. Their
vulnerability to the learned helplessness phenomenon is a function of their tendency to explain adverse events as the result of
internal, stable and global causes.
Suppose that the firm described in Part III defaults on its
debt and is forced into liquidation. To some extent, this adverse
outcome is viewed by the manager as uncontrollable. In a world

38. See Lyn Y. Abramson et al., Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and
Reformulation, 87 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 49, 49-74 (1978).
39. See id. at 52-53.
40. See id. at 56.
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of imperfect information, the true cause of a firm's failure is
usually not clear even to the unbiased observer. There is likely
to be a wide range of factors and a great deal of ambiguity
about the extent to which each factor is responsible for the
failure of the firm. As a result, under the learned helplessness
theory, the explanatory style of the particular manager in question will determine the extent to which the corporate failure
will be generalized by the manager across time and circumstances.4
External explanations for corporate failure are less likely to
be stable and global than internal explanations (unless they are
based on a generalization that life is unjust). To the extent that
a manager explains the failure of the firm in terms of deficiencies in her ability, she is attributing the outcome to a stable,
internal cause that may be generalized to managerial tasks in
the future. In this way, corporate failure in period one causes
reduced managerial effort in period two. If the explanation also
has a global dimension-for example, the manager attributes
corporate failure to her inability to inspire confidence in her
leadership-the helplessness may impair her ability to secure a
new position and may well spill over into other aspects of their
economic or personal lives. This spread of motivational deficit
finds its roots in the increased risk of corporate failure created
by the leveraging of the manager's firm.
Several scholars suggest that the phenomenon of learned
helplessness may describe the passivity and even depression of
workers who are laid off or fired. Even though conditions responsible for their unemployment may subsequently change,
these individuals sometimes lose the motivation to initiate responses that may exert some control over their circumstances.4 2 By virtue of their decision making authority in corporations, managers may differ from workers in the explanations
41. The relevance of explanatory style depends on the causal ambiguity of the
uncontrollable events. It is irrelevant when events have causes that are either easily
verifiable or have been sanctioned by the community. It is relevant either when the
event is too singular to allow causal relationships to be abstracted or when potential
causes are numerous and confounded with each other. See PETERSON ET AL., supra
note 36, at 151.
42. See, e.g., Seligman & Maier, supra note 34, at 1-9; Arthur H. Goldsmith &
William Darity, Jr., Social Psychology: Unemployment Exposure and Equilibrium Unemployment, 13 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 449, 453-56 (1992).
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they assign to corporate failure and their displacement. It is
difficult, however, to make a categorical prediction as to whether managers are more or less susceptible to learned helplessness than their subordinates. On the one hand, the managers
may be less likely to have external explanations for corporate
failure than workers that are laid off. On the other hand, individuals are often selected as managers because they are more
self-assured. Therefore, they are less likely than their workers
to find the cause of corporate failure in an internal trait that is
generalizable over time and circumstances.
Various social and cognitive psychologists offer alternative
explanations for the passivity and poor performance that tend
to follow an individual's exposure to uncontrollable adverse
outcomes. These explanations are based on the premises that
society tends to equate ability to achieve with human value,
and that self-esteem typically reflects the esteem in which the
individual is held by others. Therefore, individuals attempt at
all costs to project a positive image of ability and competence.
They may set easy goals so that they run no risk of failure, or
they may strive for unattainable goals that assure the actor of
failure with honor. If an individual has experienced failure, she
is concerned about the attributions that others may make, and
this concern shapes her approach to future tasks. Rather than
being due to a generalization of the helplessness deficit, passivity following failure may be the product of a deliberate tactic to
avoid goals and reduce effort in order to protect self-esteem.'
Individuals who have experienced failure sometimes avoid performance demands and obligations by understating their abilities. It has been suggested that depressives, in particular, may
risk short-term loss in esteem in order to avoid demands to
perform and the perceived risk of embarrassment from negative
performance outcomes in the future." Individuals may also
deliberately choose to perform future tasks under adverse conditions so that they may explain failure by external causes.45
43. This is sometimes referred to as the egotism explanation. See, e.g., Arthur
Frankel & Melvin L. Snyder, Poor Performance Following Unsolvable Problems:
Learned Helplessness or Egotism?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1415, 1415-17
(1978).
44. See, e.g., M.G. Hill et al., Depression: A Self-Presentation Formulation, in
PUBLIC SELF AND PRIVATE SELF 213 (R.F. Baumeister ed., 1986).
45. This is known as the phenomenon of self-handicapping. See ROBERT A. BARON
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Finally, individuals who have made an effort to achieve a goal
and have failed are likely to be concerned that their failure
reflects a lack of ability. This concern leads them to regard
subsequent challenges as potential failures that will inflict
further blows to self-esteem. When failure is not readily attributable to external causes, an individual's next best explanation
is lack of effort. This explanation protects the notion of self
esteem that is defined by society in terms of one's ability or
competence rather than commitment or effort. Therefore, when
faced with a subsequent task, the actor may choose not to try
in order to protect what is left of her self-esteem.'
The conditions under which managers are likely to experience
motivational deficits following corporate failure depend not only
on the causes to which they attribute the failure, but also to
the theory that is preferred. For instance, if passivity following
failure is the result of a deliberate tactic to protect self-esteem,
we would not expect that initial failure should have an adverse
impact on the performance of subsequent tasks that are generally regarded as very difficult. In contrast, the learned helplessness theory would predict that the perceived difficulty of the
subsequent task would in fact strengthen the expectation that
the individual's responses will have no impact on outcomes, and
would therefore lead to reduced motivation.
V.

CONCLUSION

While distinguished scholars have asserted that debt financing may serve as an incentive device to address managerial
agency problems, the motivational properties of debt have not
AND DONN BYRNE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: UNDERSTANDING HUMAN INTERACTION 81-83

(1991).
46. Students face the following dilemma in school:
In effect, effort can become a double-edged sword for many students. The
net result is that they must thread their way between the threatening
extremes of high effort and no effort at all. On the one hand, they must
exert some effort to avoid teacher punishment, but not so much as to
risk public shame should they try hard and fail ....
A popular tactic is
to try hard, but to provide oneself with excuses to explain why trying
did not help, thereby avoiding inferences to low ability by redirecting the
causes of failure to external factors.
Martin V. Covington & Carol L. Omelich, Effort: The Double-Edged Sword in School
Achievement, 71 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 169, 170 (1979).
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been well considered. In particular, it is not clear under what
circumstances the issuance of debt is a more cost-effective
mechanism for motivating managers than alternative mechanisms. Arguably, debt serves as a motivator by providing challenging, specific, and proximal goals for corporate management;
the firm must produce the cash flow necessary to meet periodic
fixed repayment obligations and must maintain asset value
sufficient to ensure solvency in the balance sheet sense. In this
lecture, however, I suggest that these goals may have positive
or negative motivational effects on managers. I outline several
scenarios in which the setting of challenging, specific, and proximal goals may in fact impair effort and performance. Beyond a
certain point, corporate leveraging may reduce managerial commitment to the implicit goals of cash flow or asset value by
reducing the probability the goal will be met. An important
determinant of the subjective probability of goal achievement is
the concept of self-efficacy. If the external consequences of performance hinge on an all-or-nothing, success-or-failure dichotomy, managers may be discouraged from exerting effort to come
as close as possible to their assigned goal. This effect is compounded by the potential disruption of strategy development
caused by the impending pressure of challenging goals. Part IV
identifies additional concerns that are raised by the ex post
motivational effects of corporate failure. The motivational deficits that sometimes follow failure have been described in various ways. The crucial mediator in all theories is the cause to
which an individual attributes her failure. The phenomenon of
learned helplessness, for example, predicts that, to the extent
that individuals explain their failures by internal, stable and
global causes, they may generalize their sense of helplessness
to other circumstances in which their actions may have effect.
Proponents of the motivational value of debt may respond
that these motivational difficulties are less likely to materialize
when actors have a high degree of self-efficacy and that the
training of managers ensures that they are more self-assured
than the population at large. However, this may prove too
much. It may well be true that a self-selection process ensures
that managers have a strong sense of self-efficacy. However,
social cognitive theory predicts that individuals with high selfefficacy are self-motivated to set high goals for themselves in
order to achieve self-satisfaction. Therefore, managers with high
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self-efficacy do not need the externally imposed goals of debt to
motivate them. Debt financing may therefore be the means to
direct their effort rather than to increase its intensity or persistence. Similarly, it is true that managers may undergo training
to raise their self-efficacy and that therapeutic techniques have
been developed to restore self-esteem and correct learned helplessness following failure. These measures may reduce the motivational cost of failure. However, psychologists and management consultants have also been active in designing mechanisms to motivate corporate employees at all levels. Given the
ambiguity over the motivational properties of debt, the comparative advantage of debt over any of these mechanisms has yet
to be shown. Until it is demonstrated, it cannot be assigned a
meaningful role in the capital structure debate.

